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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
are a frequent cyber attack vector which cause significant
damage to computer systems. Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), which is the core communication protocol of
the internet, has had a major upgrade and is released
as RFC 7540. This latest version, HTTP/2, has begun to
be deployed in live systems before comprehensive security
studies have been carried out on its risk from DDoS. In this
piece of research we explore using experimental method-
ology, the DDoS risk posed by the upgraded functionality
of the HTTP/2 protocol, in particular its risk from a
flood attack. Our results show that a website implementing
HTTP/2, scales up the flood attack magnitude, increasing
the risk from DDoS.
Index Terms—DDoS, HTTP2, Flood, Attack, Apache,
nghttp2, Nginx, Vulnerabilities
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-attacks have become a common sight in the
news. These attacks range from simple attacks able to
take websites offline to sophisticated malware featuring
zero day exploits.
When a distributed attack aims to take a network or
service offline, it is classified as a Distributed Denial
of Service Attack (DDoS). As more key services are
migrated to the internet, DDoS is becoming an increasing
worry for corporations and governments due to the risk
of critical services being taken offline.
DDoS attacks are growing in popularity[1] and their
attack magnitudes are rapidly increasing. The most com-
mon attack target for DDoS is the network infrastructure
due to its limited bandwidth and connection capacities
[2]. Using relatively simple attack tools, these network
links can be flooded with junk data to take the connection
offline. These attack tools are available for download
online for self-deployment or alternatively a large botnet
can be rented using a DDoS booter to carry out the
attack, accessible from a simple web store interface.
DDoS attacks can easily be started, requiring not even
the technical abilities of a script kiddie, all that is
currently required is a payment method and an ability
to use an online shop.
The Mirai botnet has taken over thousands of Internet
of Things devices such as webcam, and has taken several
key internet websites offline. Cloudflare, a DDoS CDN
provider, has recorded attacks reaching 1.75M HTTP
requests per second[3].
Due to the simplicity of many of these attack tools,
it would be easy to dismiss the research potential of
this area, however if a sophisticated threat attacker
were to become motivated to launch these attacks, the
attacks will cause create significantly more damage and
be harder to mitigate without significantly scaling up
network resources, which will eventually become eco-
nomically unsustainable.
Clients commonly communicate with web servers us-
ing the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol. In
2015 a new version of HTTP was released, HTTP/2[4].
This latest version of the HTTP protocol expanded the
protocols capabilities with the aim of decreasing website
load times. HTTP/2 implements multiplexed streams
allowing multiple requests and responses to be sent in
a single packet, as well as introducing higher levels of
header compression with the aim of reducing packet
sizes. These new capabilities are aimed at improving the
system for benign users however there is currently a lack
of research regarding its resilience against DDoS.
The benefits of HTTP/2 has been widely covered by
existing works, however the question that has not been
answered is its potential risks to DDoS. Unfortunately,
designing increased functionality for benign users, may
also provide a larger attack surface to the threat actors.
This paper explores the vulnerability of the HTTP/2
protocol against DDoS flood attacks. First we provide an
overview of the protocol features as many in the research
community are not aware of these major changes. After
this, we investigate the popular well known request flood
attack vector, to understand how an attacker may carry
out this attack using HTTP/2.
We contrast on the potency of a request flood using
HTTP/2 compared to the previous HTTP/1.1 standard.
II. HTTP/2 PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
Internet connection speeds have significantly increased
over the years to meet the demand of the internet,
however latency has only marginally improved due to
the constraints posed by transferring a signal over long
distances. In practice, the previous versions of HTTP
only allowed a single active HTTP request to be active,
with each request requiring its own individual packet.
These factors resulted in a slow connection due to round
trip times. Google initially tried to address this issue by
deploying their own version of the HTTP protocol called
SPDY onto their web servers and Chrome browsers.
After several years of fine tuning, SPDY was formally
adopted by the HTTP working group and was published
as an open standard in 2015[4]. HTTP/2 pushes out
new features to reduce page load times by reducing
the number of packets required by allowing multiplexed
streams and by allowing the server to push content to
the client before it is requested. Header compression
has also been introduced to significantly reduce the
levels of duplicate header data being sent in a single
connection. The updates implemented by HTTP/2 will
now be discussed in-depth so that the risks to DDoS can
be exposed.
A. HTTP/2 Headers
Since the introduction of HTTP, header sizes have
significantly increased. Relatively large cookie and user
agent values are now sent with each request. These
values are typically the same for subsequent request
resulting in large amounts of data being duplicated
throughout the connection. HTTP/2 aims to solve this by
introducing its own bespoke header compression format,
HPACK[5]. HPACK introduces memory tables to store
frequent data so that requests can reference the header
values from these memory tables. When header values
are sent, they are also Huffman Encoded to reduce their
transmission size.
HPACK introduces two memory tables, the static and
dynamic table. The static table is defined by the RFC,
and is predefined with common values such as header
names and response codes. The dynamic table however
is volatile and is initialised and filled during each con-
nection. A dynamic table is created independently by
each party. When a header field value is first sent, the
client can notify the server to store it in its dynamic table.
Subsequent requests by the client can reference the value
in the table instead of repeatedly transmitting the value
in full. HTTP header fields can be stored in this table,
such as frequently recurring values such as the domain
name, user agent and cookie fields.
B. HTTP/2 Server Push
The protocol also enables new functionality to allow
the server to initiate flows to the client. It has a Server
Push feature allowing for the server to send a file to
the client before it is requested. It is common that a
certain file is always required on a website for example a
style sheet. As the server knows the client will eventually
request this, it can reduce the load time by sending it to
the client in advance to provide the user with a quicker
load time.
C. HTTP/2 Stream Control
Historically HTTP requests were sent sequentially in
a queue and each request requiring it’s own individual
packet. HTTP/2 implements flow control in the appli-
cation layer allowing multiplexing within the HTTP
frame. This flow control has similar functionality to TCP,
resulting in the possibility of TCP becoming redundant
in the future [6]. Both HTTP requests and responses are
multiplexed in HTTP/2 as can be seen in Figure 1. The
multiplexing of outgoing requests is not a completely
new concept as pipelining was introduced in HTTP/1.1
however it was never enabled on modern browsers due
to performance issues.
Fig. 1. HTTP/2 Streams
By default, each HTTP/2 connection has a maximum
concurrent stream value, this puts a limit on the number
of streams which can be opened at a point in time.
The RFC recommends a minimum of 100 however each
HTTP/2 implementation can decide the exact value. In
current implementations, the current chosen values are
100 for Apache and nghttp2, whilst Nginx uses 128. If
a value is not defined by the clients, the initial value is
assumed to be infinite. This allows the maximum number
of concurrent requests to be sent from a client simulta-
neously, on a single TCP connection and potentially all
within a single packet. This gives benefits to the user
due to less packets being required, therefore less packet
overheads and an overall reduced round trip time.
If a client has more requests to send than the maximum
concurrent thread limit, they initially will only be able
to send the amount specified by the limit, however they
can send the remaining requests once the initial streams
are closed.
Each request is also given a priority weighting which
is implemented using dependency trees, allowing for
the client to control the scheduling of responses. Flow
control is also enabled for the management of the
bandwidth rates. Window sizes can be set either for the
entire connection or per stream. The window sizes are
controlled using window size updates which are set by a
HTTP/2 setting frame. Each Stream is given a unique
ID, starting at Stream 0. Setting Frames are always
transmitted using stream 0, with the incremented streams
being divided between the client and server. The client
has control of the odd numbered streams, whereas the
server uses the even numbered streams.
D. HTTP/2 Potential Vulnerabilities
Historically, multiple DDoS attack methods have been
discovered for targeting a HTTP/1.1 web server. Many
of these existing attacks are still applicable with the
new protocol, however a sophisticated attacker carrying
out these attacks may be able to obtain a larger attack
power using this new protocol. Due to this risk, the RFC
contains a brief section dedicated to some of the issues
the protocol introduces in relation to DDoS [4].
New attacks have also been enabled by this new
protocol version. HTTP/2 manages flows using priorities
and window updates. An attacker can exploit these
newly introduced flow mechanisms to cause DDoS. If an
attacker floods the web server with flow window updates,
the web server will consume processor power trying to
manage the flow scheduler, which can cause the server
to be unable to respond to genuine requests
HTTP Flood has been a major DDoS attack vector.
This attack aims to flood the server with application
requests, causing the server to be unable to respond to
genuine requests due to being overloaded. With HTTP/2
multiplexing, an attacker will be able to send simultane-
ous requests on the same connection, hence giving the
attacker a greater attack power, as with a single packet
they can now issue magnitudes more requests instead of
just a single request.
III. RELATED WORK
E Damon et al [7] analysed slow attacks against
HTTP/1.1 servers by consuming all of the available
server resources. These attacks are sophisticated requir-
ing knowledge by the attacker on the inner workings of
the server thread controller.
S Ranjan et al [8] investigated the HTTP Flood
attack were attackers flooded the server with requests to
overwhelm the processing power of the server. They in-
vestigated HTTP/1.1 attacks including request flooding,
asymmetric workload and repeat one shot attacks.
E Adi et al[9] [10] were the first to analyse the
implications of DDoS on HTTP/2. They looked at the
flow mechanisms introduced to the application layer and
demonstrated attacks relating to the abuse of window
sizes to overload the web server due to the management
of flows.
Researchers at the cyber security vendor Imperva,
released a white paper in August 2016 analysing four
flaws with HTTP/2[11] which were a mix between
bug flaws in web server software and flaws with the
protocol itself. Their first flaw was with Microsoft IIS’s
implementation of stream multiplexing, their second flaw
was implementation issue on all major web servers when
an attacker implemented slow read, this attack was appli-
cable to HTTP/1.1 however using HTTP/2 they required
less TCP connections, their third flaw was against the
HTTP/2 protocol’s priority and dependency controls by
creating a dependency cycle loop and their last flaw was
a implementation issue of HPACK, which they exploited
by creating a HPACK header compression bomb which
when decompressed consumed all of the web servers
memory.
IV. RATIONALE FOR CURRENT RESEARCH
Extensive research has been carried out on previous
HTTP versions however currently, the only published
work directly relating to HTTP/2 DDoS has been per-
formed by E Adi et al[9][10] and the security vendor
Imperva [11] and do not provide a complete coverage of
potential attack vectors.
The changes in the new protocol dramatically change
the overall operation of the protocol and has altered the
threat posed by DDoS. There is currently no research
into the risks posed by existing flood attacks when
performed using HTTP/2.
Request flood attacks are a major threat, and are a
frequent attack vector, however due to the multiplexing
of requests, this allows more requests to be sent simul-
taneously to a victim.
From obtaining knowledge of this attack, before it is
seen by industry, this paper aims to provide the field
with a threat model so that the security risk can be
mitigated in future defence proposals. This will allow
for defences to keep ahead of the attack tools currently
used by attackers and also allow for companies to decide
if the benefits of HTTP/2 outweigh the potential DDoS
risk.
V. REQUEST FLOOD ATTACK
A website can be taken offline if the processing
power of the web server can be consumed by mali-
cious requests. One method of doing this is using a
HTTP Flood attack, it does this by issuing thousands
of bogus requests. As the requests are received at the
web server, this consumes the applications resources
by requiring large CPU power to generate responses.
There are also large overheads required for handling the
incoming connection states which can consume up the
server’s available threads.
HTTP Flood attacks have existed with the previous
version of HTTP, however we question if the latest
version, HTTP/2 will increase the potency of this attack
due to the introduction of concurrent streams as can be
seen in Figure 2. This risk has not been looked at by
existing research.
Fig. 2. HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 Flood Attacks
To understand this risk, we initially performed the
historical HTTP/1.1 attacks to understand where the
attack strength bottleneck was located. This provided
us with increased understanding on the limitations of
the current DDoS attacks. We subsequently preformed
the same attack using HTTP/2 to demonstrate how the
attack would perform and if the new functionality of the
protocol would provide an attacker with a larger attack
surface whilst using the same attack resources.
To perform the experiments without causing harm to
live networks, a testbed was instead deployed comprising
of web servers running HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 in their
default configurations with no proxy or load balanc-
ing. Extrinsic throughput measurements were taken and
analysed to provide the necessary metrics to show the
damage caused by each protocol version.
A. Testbed
The test bed composed of two Ubuntu Linux hosts.
The attack node composed of a physical computer com-
prised of a Intel i7-4770 CPU, 3.40GH, 4 cores, 8
threads with 12GB Ram whilst the virtual server was
configured on a Xen Server, Intel Xeon E5-2637 3.5Ghz,
with 8 threads and 4GB of main memory allocated. The
monitored traffic generation was the egress traffic from
the physical desktop.
The web server used for all flood simulations was
nghttp2 v1.10.1. The hosts are linked together using a
Cisco c3750x with a 1Gbit Ethernet link. The hosts links
are speed tested to prove they can transmit 1GBit/sec
between them.
B. Flood Attack Methodology
An attack tool was created to generate the attack.
Firstly, the script sent HTTP/1.1 requests repeatedly to
the web server. The attack software was run using the
physical desktop utilising 800 simultaneous connections
each running on an independent thread. Using multiple
connections allows for the link to be utilised to it’s max-
imum. Varying numbers of connections were attempted
to determine the optimum quantity of 800.
The aim of the attack was to generate the maximum
number of requests to the web server, therefore the attack
tool did not parse the web server responses.
The attack was repeated, but modified to utilise
the HTTP/2 protocol. Due to HTTP/2 Multiplexing,
each TCP packet now comprised of many simultaneous
streams dependent on the max concurrent value set by
the server. All subsequent requests are also able to
reference the first requests header values reducing the
bandwidth per request. An initial Settings Frame and
window update frame were sent to initialise the channel
before the subsequent streams were transmitted as can
be seen in Figure 3.
The RFC recommends a minimum max concurrent
value of 100 however can be altered by the server. To
give a large range of results, this value was set to 100,
128, 256 and 512 for the attack simulations in order to
provide full visibility on how the max concurrent values
affect the risk from DDoS.
Fig. 3. HTTP/2 Packet Format captured by wireshark
C. Flood Attack Results
During the HTTP/1 attack, an average of 15,975
Requests/Second were sent to the server. When the traffic
was analysed to obtain the location of the bottleneck,
it was clear that it was not the network link capacity
as it was not saturated. The outgoing attack traffic
only consumed 46.8Mb/s of throughput of the available
1Gbit/s link, the bottleneck however was found to be the
packet generation rate of the device. It was only able to
generate 0.016M outgoing Packets/Sec, due to the kernel
overheads required to generate each data packet. This can
be seen in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Packets and KBits per second during HTTP/1 Attack
TABLE I
POSSIBLE REQUEST RATES
Protocol Max Concurrent Req/Sec Relative to HTTP/1
HTTP1 N/A 15,975 N/A
HTTP2 100 914,706 57.26x
HTTP2 128 995,670 62.33x
HTTP2 256 1,414,859 88.57x
HTTP2 512 1,525,272 95.48x
Each HTTP/1 packet generated was small resulting in
the small utilisation of the bandwidth however it was
the generation of the unique TCP header and kernel
utilisation which limited the system during traffic genera-
tion. Modern network card have inbuilt offload capability
to offload part of this requirement, however this was
enabled for this experiment to minimise the bottleneck.
This results demonstrates that even if an attacker can
get an attacker host with large bandwidth, there will
be little advantage for a HTTP/1 Flood attack. The
limitation is the processing power and network card
offload capability to generate large quantities of packets.
When the flood attack was repeated using HTTP/2,
the attack computer was able to send more requests.
The results in Table I show the larger attack surface for
HTTP/2. The HTTP/2 attack bottleneck was again packet
generation, however due to multiplexing, the attack had
increased request generation as each packet could hold
multiple streams. This allowed for an attacker on the
same hardware, to carry out a larger attack with the same
packet generation limitation.
For the base max concurrent user value of 100, the at-
tacker had a 57 times larger attack power, this effectively
gave the attack computer running HTTP/2 the attack
power of a 57 computer botnet running HTTP/1.1. This
attack power increased as the server’s max concurrent
stream limit was increased as can be seen in the results
table.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
The objective of the research is to understand, in a
HTTP/2 deployment, the risk of a DDoS attack rela-
tive to the threat posed by the previous version. For
HTTP flood attacks, it has been demonstrated that the
bottleneck for an attacker, is packet generation. Due to
HTTP/2 allowing multiple requests per packet, this gives
the attacker a major advantage and results in an attack
with increased potency.
Larger max concurrent values do give better QoS
to benign users as it allows more streams to be used
simultaneously, however it can clearly be seen in the
results that it also gives an attacker a larger attack surface
for flood attacks. The RFC specifies a minimum limit of
100 with current implementations use 100 or 128 limits.
With the recommended minimum max concurrent stream
value of 100, an attacker will leverage 57.3x more flood
requests compared to the previous protocol version with
our attack script. Presently Nginx uses a higher value of
128, allowing for 62.3x more requests than HTTP/1.1. It
is therefore recommended for this value to be kept at a
lower level to minimise the risk posed by DDoS Flood
attacks.
We believe we have benefited the research community
by providing this information so that suitable defence
mechanisms can be proposed. We hope to explore suit-
able detection strategies in our future work and analyse
further attack methods relevant to HTTP/2. HTTP/2
deployment is on the rise, however security research on
this new protocol is inadequate, we have provided much
needed research on this protocol so that future deploy-
ments can be implemented with security from DDoS.
We end with a question to the technical community of
whether the speed improvements of HTTP/2 are worth
exposing the web server to a larger attack surface, before
suitable detection methods are created and deployed.
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